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Abstract
Obergefell v. Hodges decided in 2015 was a
landmark case that answered two questions: (i)
does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state
to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex, and (ii) does the Fourteenth Amendment
require a state to recognize a marriage between
two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state (Obergefell v. Hodges)? In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court answered both questions in the affirmative.
Particularly relevant to the majority’s reasoning
in deciding this case is Ronald Dworkin’s theory
on judicial decisions from Hard Cases, a case not
settled by precedent. Dworkin utilizes concepts
such as the rights thesis and the doctrine of political responsibility to formulate his theory of adjudication. The rights thesis states that justices
can make decisions that enforce existing rights.
The doctrine of political responsibility ensures
justices make consistent decisions. Viewing the
law through principle rather than policy, Ronald
Dworkin utilizes the rights thesis and the doctrine
of political responsibility to assemble his theory of
adjudication. Through an analysis of Dworkin’s
theory of adjudication, this paper will show how
Dworkin’s principles are found in the majority’s
reasoning in Obergefell v. Hodges.

1. Argument
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1.1. Theory of Adjudication

Before discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, I will
explain Dworkin’s beliefs regarding adjudication,
“a judicial decision or sentence”(Adjudication).
Dworkin’s adjudication explanation acknowledges that “Judges should apply the law that other
institutions have made; they should not make
new law” (Dimock 219). The idea that judges
should not make new laws follows the argument
that judges are pseudo-legislators, which Dworkin
contends is not the entire truth (Dimock 219).
Dworkin supports the idea that judges are not
pseudo-legislators when he states, “judges neither
should be nor are deputy legislators, and the familiar assumption, that when they go beyond political
decisions already made by someone else they are
legislating, is misleading” (Dimock 219). However, Dworkin does not provide an immediate reason as to why this is the case. Instead, Dworkin
states that a distinction between policy and principal arguments will clarify the issue. Policy arguments are used to support a political decision progressing society’s collective goals (Dimock 2019).
Principle arguments support a political decision
that “respects or secures some individual or group
right” (Dimock 219). The distinction between policy and principle is essential as Dworkin will soon
argue that by utilizing principle, judges can be insulated from attacks of policymaking.
Additionally, Dworkin differentiates between
hard and civil cases when he states that a hard
case is “when no settled rule dictates a decision
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either way” (Dimock 220). A discussion of hard
cases is critical because those are cases that are
not settled law, and the Supreme Court decides
these cases. Dworkin’s thesis on adjudication is
that “judicial decisions in civil cases, even in hard
cases...characteristically are and should be generated by principle not policy” (Dimock 220). He
acknowledges that his adjudication thesis needs
more explanation and does so in the next section. Dworkin’s thesis on adjudication, combined
with upcoming concepts such as the rights thesis
and doctrine of political responsibility, apply to
Obergefell v. Hodges.
1.2. Dworkin’s Explanation

Dworkin says the judiciary should be secondary to the legislature, and there are two objections to the concept of judicial originality. Judicial
originality is the idea that judicial decisions “create” new political rights/principles when making
decisions.
The first objection to judicial originality is that
“the law should be made by elected and responsible officials” (Dimock 220). Dworkin accommodates this objection by saying that it would
be uncontroversial in the frame of law as policy
(Dimock 220). Dworkin reminds the reader that
law as policy is “a compromise among individual
goals and purposes in search of the welfare of the
community as a whole” (Dimock 220). Dworkin
agrees that within our political system of representative democracy, looking at law as policy works
better than a system of judges unelected to adjudicate new policies interfering with political interests. An example of the sentiment that judges interfere with political interests can be found in Senator Sessions op-ed about Supreme Court nominee Elana Kagan. Senator Sessions exhorted President Obama to pick “someone who is committed
to the text of the Constitution and the vision of
the Founding Fathers, or whether his nominee is
an activist who will shed a judge’s neutral, constitutional role to push a progressive policy agenda”
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(Rosdeitcher 2010). Senator Session’s sentiments
illuminate a preference for judicial conservatism,
not activism. These two terms may be more familiar to the reader. The judicial conservatism
described by Senator Session can be defined as
the belief that “the constitutional text ought to be
given the original public meaning that it would
have had at the time that it became law” (Calabresi). In comparison, judicial activism is defined
as rulings “issued by a judge that overlooks legal
precedents or past constitutional interpretations in
favor of protecting individual rights or serving a
broader political agenda” (Spitzer 2020).
The second objection against judicial originality is “if a judge makes new law and applies it
retroactively in the case before him, then the losing party will be punished, not because he violated
some duty he had, but rather a new duty created after the event” (Dimock 220). Like the first objection, Dworkin acknowledges that this objection is
persuasive regarding a policy lens.Dworkin states,
“it would be wrong to sacrifice the rights of an innocent man in the name of some new duty created
after the event; it does, therefore, seem wrong to
take property from one individual and hand it to
another in order just to improve overall economic
efficiency” (Dimock 220). Dworkin explains the
persuasion by referencing the Spartan Steel case,
where the court had to decide “whether to allow
the plaintiff recovery for economic loss following negligent damage to someone else’s property”
(Dimock 220). Establishing the retroactivity of an
argument of policy in cases such as Spartan Steel,
Dworkin proffers an alternative to a policy justification, an argument of principle.
Dworkin claims that arguments of principle do
not rest on the political concerns of a community. This claim insulates judicial opinion from
attack by the first objection because an argument
of principle focuses on the right ‘claimed’ and
makes a decision irrelevant to the political interests or the accusation of policymaking (Dimock
221). Dworkin dismisses the idea of retroactivity in the second objection because the court did
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not create the right; the right was already in existence (Dimock 221). The point that a court can
be insulated from policy making when asserting a
right already in existence will prove to be crucial
to the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges.
An existing right refutes retroactive laws, otherwise known as ex post facto law, which are defined
as “a criminal statute that punishes actions retroactively, thereby criminalizing conduct that was legal when originally performed” (Ex Post Facto.).
If Dworkin said that courts could create new nonexisting principles, that would violate retroactivity. If someone said, “What about a case where
the decision is not decided by statute but by some
“principle” that the court decides is applicable in
the case.” Dworkin responds by saying that plaintiffs have a right to the decision being made in
their favor. If the decision is uncontroversial and
arises based on principle and not statute, the defendant cannot claim retroactivity or feign surprise
(Dimock 221).
After countering the two objections to judicial
originality, Dworkin moves on to another problem
of jurisprudence when he states, “Lawyers believe
that when judges make new law [in hard cases]
their decisions are constrained by legal traditions
but are nevertheless personal and original” (Dimock 221). The idea that judges utilize legal tradition and beliefs in deciding cases is inherently
contradictory. Dworkin acknowledges “the problem of explaining how these different contributions to the decision of a hard case are to be identified and reconciled” (Dimock 221). Dworkin offers the rights thesis as the answer.
1.3. The Rights Thesis

Dworkin describes the rights thesis as judicial decisions that enforce political rights already
in existence (Dimock 221). The rights thesis resolves the tension between judicial originality and
institutional history because utilizing existing political rights suggests that institutions act as a part
of the judges’ evaluation rather than a restraint
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(Dimock 221). Judges can use political rights that
have standing in the history and morality of society to make new judgments that reflect the past decisions of society rather than be perceived as a new
perversion of existing law (Dimock 221). However, Dworkin acknowledges that this can lead
to judges making a judgment “that requires some
compromise between considerations that ordinarily combine in any calculation of political right,
but here compete” (Dimock 221). Here, Dworkin
acknowledges that judges weigh the existing political rights of the plaintiff and defendant to see
which one wins. With the rights thesis established,
Dworkin introduces the doctrine of political responsibility (Dimock 221).
1.4. The Doctrine of Political Responsibility

Dworkin defines political responsibility as political officials justifying a decision “within a political theory that also justifies the other decisions
they propose to make” (Dimock 221). Essentially,
the doctrine denounces decisions that can be argued in a vacuum but cannot be justified when
considering a string of decisions. Dworkin states
that policies do not provide the consistency demanded by the doctrine because they do not acquiesce to equal treatment (Dimock 222). Dworkin
gives an example of policy inconsistency when
he states, “It does not follow from the doctrine
of responsibility, therefore, that if the legislature
awards a subsidy to one aircraft manufacturer one
month it must award a subsidy to another manufacturer the next” (Dimock 222). Principles, like
policy, are given an example when Dworkin states,
“If an official, for example, believes that sexual
liberty of some sort is a right of individuals, then
he must protect that liberty in a way that distributes the benefit reasonably equally over the
class of those whom he supposes to have the right”
(Dimock 222). Here, an argument based on principle provides the flexibility that allows the fulfillment of distributional consistency found within
the doctrine of responsibility. Establishing an ar-
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gument of principle fulfills the doctrine of responsibility; Dworkin states this about judicial decisions, “If the rights thesis holds, then the distinction just made would account, at least in a very
general way, for the special concern that judges
show for both precedents and hypothetical examples” (Dimock 222). This “very general way”
discussed in the quote is detailed when Dworkin
states, “An argument of principle can supply a justification for a particular decision, under the doctrine of responsibility, only if the principle cited
can be shown to be consistent with earlier decisions not recanted” (Dimock 222). Again, an argument of principle proves superior to an argument of policy because the consistency of principle can be applied across cases, while policy might
result in inconsistencies. This point becomes important as the majority opinion in Obergefell v.
Hodges displays the consistency desired.
The ideas established by Dworkin that have
been discussed are numerous. Here are a few:
Judges do not legislate when they make decisions
that are so-called “beyond political decisions already made by someone else” (Dimock 220). Judicial decisions in civil or hard cases should be
generated by principle and not policy (Dimock
220). Judicial decisions utilizing principle are insulated from political interests and the threat of
retroactivity because judges enforce existing political rights (rights thesis) that reflect the society’s
past decisions (Dimock 221). The rights thesis
thus fulfills the doctrine of responsibility. It allows
justices to make decisions that can be equally applied across several cases (Dimock 222). Before
moving into Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
and how it reflects Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, it is important to point out weaknesses in
Dworkin’s theory and other critiques.
One weakness in Dworkin’s theory is that
it could justify an evil policy. According to
Dworkin, the rights thesis fulfills the doctrine
of political responsibility. What if the principles reinforced in society’s history and past decisions (rights thesis) are wicked? This could cause
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judges from cultures that have particularly complicated human rights pasts to affirm principles
that would be particularly worrisome for human
rights. Ultimately, Dworkin’s theory could justify a case through principle, which could lead to
harmful policy.
Additionally, one could accuse Dworkin of
aiding judges being policymakers.
Dworkin
makes it clear that judges should justify decisions
through principle. However, one’s principles can
be highly influenced by ideology. So, one could
say that explaining a decision through “principle”
is just another way for judges to shield personal
political ideology to enforce their left-leaning or
right-leaning ideology.
1.5. Application of Obergefell v. Hodges

This sub-section of the paper provides support proving the majority opinion delivered by
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges reflects
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication (Obergefell v.
Hodges.). Specifically, Justice Kennedy’s third
section of the majority opinion demonstrates the
idea that judges should decide cases on principle
rather than on policy.
In section three of the opinion, Justice
Kennedy begins with the Due Process Clause
(Obergefell v. Hodges). The Due Process Clause,
in the 14th Amendment, states that no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (Obergefell v.
Hodges). Justice Kennedy states that the liberties protected by the Clause extend to “certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices that define
personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S 438,453 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 486 (1965) (Obergefell
v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy states that a part of
the judiciary’s duty to interpret the Constitution
is the identification and protection of fundamental
rights (Obergefell v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy
acknowledges that interpretation of the Constitu-
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tion is not an exact science. Still, he does state,
“History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries” (Obergefell v. Hodges). It does not set “its outer boundaries” because Justice Kennedy sees the nature of
injustice as one that has evolved as our attitudes by
generation have changed (Obergefell v. Hodges).
These changes in attitude have created the platform for societal changes regarding marriage, gay
rights, and gay marriage, as described earlier in
the opinion. Utilizing the idea that with changes
in societal attitude, the enforcement of claims to
liberties one has been excluded from occurs, Justice Kennedy launched the principle the majority’s
decision is based on, the right to marriage.
He starts by noting that the Supreme Court
has upheld the right to marry in cases such as
Loving v. Virginia (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail
(1978), and Turner v. Safley (1987) (Obergefell v.
Hodges). For example, In Loving v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court “invalidated a prohibition on interracial marriage under both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause” (Obergefell v.
Hodges). The common component in these cases
is that the Due Process Clause protects the right
to marry. Justice Kennedy states that the precedents laid by using the principle of the right to
marry have presumably only meant to protect marriage between a man and a woman (Obergefell v.
Hodges). However, within these cases, Kennedy
finds that they have expressed general constitutional principles that possess broad reach within
marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy
says that an analysis of these principles, which
number four in total, will prove that same-sex couples can exercise the right to marry (Obergefell v.
Hodges).
The first relevant principle set by the Court is
that the “right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy” (Obergefell v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy
points to Loving v. Virginia as displaying the intrinsic connection between marriage and liberty
(Obergefell v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy ac-
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knowledges that it would be hypocritical of the
Court to recognize the right to privacy in some
parts of family life but not when it comes to marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). Additionally, Justice Kennedy cites the Supreme Court of Massachusetts because it affirmed the idea that marriage is a concept of autonomy and even characterized it as one of “life’s momentous acts of selfdefinition” (Obergefell v. Hodges).
The second reason outlined is that the “right
to marry is fundamental because it supports a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals” (“Obergefell
v. Hodges). Here, a case cited by Justice Kennedy
is Turner v. Safley (Obergefell v. Hodges). In
Turner v. Safley, the Court noted the importance of
the union of marriage when it decided that prisoners could not be “denied the right to marry because
their committed relationships satisfied the basic
reasons why marriage is a fundamental right”
(Obergefell v. Hodges). Another reason in support
is the idea of marriage responding to the “universal fear that a lonely person might call out only
to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that
while both still live, there will be someone to care
for the other” (Obergefell v. Hodges).
The third reason is that the right to marry
“safeguards children and families and thus draws
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation and education” (Obergefell v. Hodges).
Justice Kennedy recognizes this principle when
the Court states in Zablocki that, “[T]he right to
‘marry, establish a home and bring up children
is a central part of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause” (Obergefell v. Hodges). The
principle is further supported by the fact that marriage provides the foundation for a stable home
and consistency that is in the best interest of one’s
children (Obergefell v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy
points out that both parties in the case agree that
same-sex couples can provide “loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted,” and have been providing that to
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thousands upon thousands of kids at this very moment (Obergefell v. Hodges). In addition, several
states allow gays and lesbians to adopt children
either single or while in a relationship (Obergefell
v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy points to the ironic
nature of the idea that gays and lesbians are not
allowed to get married but can fulfill a central pillar of marriage by raising children (Obergefell v.
Hodges).
The fourth reason is the “Court’s cases and
the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage
is a keystone of our social order” (Obergefell v.
Hodges). Justice Kennedy cites Maynard v. Hill
(1888) when the Court explained that marriage is
“the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress” (Obergefell v. Hodges). Cementing
marriage as a pillar of society, Justice Kennedy
cites the many benefits that society and government confer on married couples, such as “taxation;
inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access... workers’ compensation
benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules” (Obergefell v. Hodges).
Citing these benefits allows Justice Kennedy to
state that because same-sex couples are excluded
from these benefits, it burdens them to live unequally compared to their married opposite-sex
peers (Obergefell v. Hodges). Following these
principles, Justice Kennedy states, “The limitation
of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with
the central meaning of the fundamental right to
marry is now manifest” (Obergefell v. Hodges).
Despite this statement, Justice Kennedy explains
that the respondents, in this case, feel it is the
wrong framing of the issue.
The respondents in Obergefell claim that the
petitioners are attempting to assert the right to
same-sex marriage and not the right to marry
(Obergefell v. Hodges). This claim is substantiated by the respondents when they cite Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), which enumerated
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a “‘careful description’ of fundamental rights”
(Obergefell v. Hodges). Justice Kennedy says that
the usage of Glucksberg is a misplaced equivocation. In Glucksberg, the approach of the “careful
description of fundamental rights” regarding history was appropriate for physician-assisted suicide
but not for marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges). In the
case of marriage, Justice Kennedy again cites Loving, Turner, and Zablocki when he states, “Loving did not ask about a “right to interracial marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a
“right of fathers with unpaid child support duties
to marry” (Obergefell v. Hodges). These cases
prove Kennedy’s point regarding the idea that the
petitioners in Obergefell v. Hodges claim the right
to marry and not the right to same-sex marriage. In
disproving the respondents’ framing of the constitutional question, Justice Kennedy allows the majority’s opinion to speak for itself. The argument
is that the principle of the right to marry through
the Equal Protection Clause has been affirmed by
the Supreme Court repeatedly in Loving, Zablocki,
and Turner. Using the basis of principle, Justice
Kennedy declares, “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . The
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry” (Obergefell
v. Hodges).
By explaining Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in the case Obergefell v. Hodges, it has
been shown to reflect several of Dworkin’s beliefs
on adjudication. The first is the usage of principles
to justify decision-making. Justice Kennedy uses
the principle of the right to marry and the precedents that support this principle to support the
legalization of same-sex marriage. Some might
say this decision reflects an assertion of a “new
right” by pointing to the several areas in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion where he says “new” in reference to gay marriage. This critique is misguided because Justice Kennedy enforces an exist-
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ing right, as explained by Dworkin’s rights thesis,
the right to marry. This idea that there is anything
“new” in this case regarding rights/principles is
not apparent in the majority’s reasoning. Justice
Kennedy also showcases Dworkin’s idea that the
rights thesis can fulfill the doctrine of responsibility. Justice Kennedy shows that the right to marry
has been equally applied in many cases brought to
the Supreme Court. Additionally, Justice Kennedy
explains the principle of the right to marry, used
in Obergefell is used in Loving and Turner, which
has not been overturned, in affirming the right to
marry. Thus, Justice Kennedy fulfills this qualification by Dworkin, “An argument of principle can
supply a justification for a particular decision, under the doctrine of responsibility, only if the principle cited can be shown to be consistent with earlier decisions not recanted” (Dimock 222).
2. Conclusion
This paper has proven the idea that the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges reflects
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication outlined in the
section titled Hard Cases. This was done by showcasing the majority opinion’s usage of principles
such as the right to marry and history/precedent
from the court cases such as Loving v. Virginia,
Zablocki v. Redhail, and Turner v. Safley to prove
the existing principle of the right to marry and thus
fulfill the doctrine of responsibility.
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